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I Introduction
In the last years European countries regularly debate about relaxing shop opening hours legislation. As an outcome of this debate some legal restrictions have been relaxed for example in Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. Since 1972 in Sweden opening hours are unrestricted for all stores. Until June 1996 Dutch shops were not allowed to be open on evenings and on Sundays, today
shops can be open from 6 to 22 hours and Sunday trading can be allowed 12 times a year (and on all Sundays in tourist regions). In Germany liberalization was decided in November 1996 changing closing time on weekdays from 18.30 to 20.00 and on Saturday from 14.00 to 16.00 hours.
From an economic point of view strong arguments exist for a less tight regulation of shop opening hours. The fast growing empirical literature about this issue stresses unequivocally out more employment and welfare gains for consumers. Burda (2000) and Gradus (1996) show that many European countries consider deregulation relevant for the policy debate concerning unemployment and job creation.
The economic literature points to substantial positive employment effects of longer opening hours, mainly due to an increase of threshold labour but possibly also as the result of increased sales as in Goos (2005) , Gradus (1996) and Skuterud (2005) . Moreover, liberalization results in markedly relaxed time constraints for consumers. The effect on prices is more doubtful. According to 1 Nooteboom (1983) and CPB (1995) average prices may increase or decrease, dependent on the sum of higher costs due to increased threshold labour. On the other hand, Thurik (1984) reasons that an increase in productivity as a result of higher capital utilization may induce lower costs. Tanguay et al. (1995) suggests on the basis of evidence from the 1990 liberalization in Quebec that mark-ups may increase and that prices rise. However, this evidence is rather weak as it is based on short term effects only. The evidence from Sweden and the US suggests that prices fell (Burda and Weil, 2001 ).
Despite these positive economic effects most European countries still restrict opening on Sundays. In Germany, Norway and Switzerland opening is prohibited. Only in some countries, such as Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom, there are (nearly) no legal restrictions. In Denmark and Finland restrictions apply only for large stores. These countries all have national regulation. In a few other countries, Belgium, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, the decision is deregulated to the municipal or regional level.
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One reason for the high occurrence of restrictive Sunday opening laws might be that in the decision process not only effects on economic growth and employment play an important role, but also religious and social aspects. This is a general finding in the literature. Hersch et al. (2004) , for instance, demonstrate that smoking regulation is the outcome of a complex interaction between economic arguments, interest group behavior and social preferences. Burda and Weil (2001) show that restrictions on Sunday trading are important 2 if external effects of ruinous competition exist. In some European countries the regulation of Sunday shop opening hours is intended to reserve the Sunday as religious day for going to the church or pause day to rest. The restrictions in some US states on Sunday trading seem to have a religious background as well.
Moreover, trade unions have supported restrictive policies from a social perspective.
Therefore, the decision process in most countries reflects an interesting trade-off. If markets value externalities like social implications and religious values improperly, regulation internalises these externalities. On the other hand this regulation reduces consumer choice and employment. Whether benefits are higher than costs, may depend on local circumstances. An important question is, therefore, which jurisdiction should make such a trade-off. Oates (1969) proves that welfare increases when the trade-off does take place at the level where externalities are valued homogenously. This means in our case that an important question is whether municipalities differ with respect to the values attached to Sunday shop opening externalities. If this is the case, the municipal level seems to be the appropriate jurisdiction from an economic point of view.
The empirical literature presents only two studies that evaluate some of the reasons for liberal or restrictive shopping laws. Price and Yandle (1987) discuss for 25 US states the Sunday closing laws in 1970 and 1984. In 1970 they found evidence for a number of explaining variables for restrictive opening policies, including religious affiliation, political influence and the participation of women 3 in the labour force. However, the 1984 results offer much less explanatory power. Ferris (1991) presents evidence for 45 Ontario cities. From the data it follows that higher female labour participation will decrease the probability of choosing early closing hours and that cities with a greater population density have more liberal laws. In this article weak evidence is found for religious affiliation, mostly because of data problems.
Therefore, the evidence on the reasons for Sunday opening laws are not very clear. The Dutch policy, deregulation of the decision on Sunday shop opening to the municipal level, provides a natural experiment that makes it possible to increase this evidence. Based on 2003 data for all (489) Dutch municipalities we analyse the determinants for differences in local shop opening regimes. We show that variation between municipalities depends on differences in interests of shop owners, social demand, ideology and regional circumstances. This indicates that the municipal level seems to be the appropriate jurisdiction to decide on shop opening from an economic point of view.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the methodology and section III describes the data. Section IV presents the estimation results. Section V gives some robustness tests and section VI concludes.
II Methodology
The basis for our analysis is the explanation of the decision Dutch municipalities made regarding the opening of shops on Sundays. As endogenous variable we have a variable (SO i ) describing the Sunday shop policy of municipality i. The main difference between municipalities is whether they allow Sunday openings or not. Therefore, our first specification is a binary probit model. At the other side, especially small shop owners often experience difficulties when they expand opening hours due to the need to employ a certain 'threshold' labour at all times as in Nooteboom (1983) . More restrictive regulation of opening hours tends to favour small stores. Furthermore, liberalizing shop opening hours regulation has the effect of lowering access cost and, according to Morrison and Newman (1983) , the sales of large stores will increase. There is some evidence that local politicians often react to this unequal competition between small and large shops. This reaction will of course depend on the presence of small shops versus large shops. Therefore, we include the average number of employees per shop for each municipality (SS i ).
Moreover, excessive shop opening hours in surrounding municipalities might generate competitive pressure. If customers can shop in surrounding municipalities, turnover turnover will diminish in municipalities with closed shops on Sunday. Ferris (1991) argues that retailers view shop hours as an effective instrument to appropriate customers from rivals. Kay and Morris (1987) show that competitive pressure may induce excessive opening at times when high costs would be incurred. We test this theory by including an impact factor measuring the extent of shop opening days in surrounding municipalities.
6
This impact factor is calculated using the following equation:
where EN i is the impact factor of municipality i, i is a vector of all municipalities, j is a vector of the municipalities with a liberal shop opening policy in the neighbourhood of municipality i.
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The second theory is based on the social demand for shop opening on Sundays. Jacobsen and Kooreman (2004) prove that the time spent on shopping on Sundays has increased significantly since the liberalization of Dutch opening hours. Thum and Weichenrieder (1997) argue that the possibilities to shop during the week will be less for couples that work both.
They will value unrestricted shopping hours higher than single income families due to higher real (opportunity) cost of time during weekdays. We include the incidence of household with a double income (HD i ) to test this theory.
A second household characteristic that might influence social demand for shop opening on Sundays is the size of the household. According to Eurostat (2003) parents of large households spent more time at home. We include the number of inhabitants per household (HS i ) to test whether large households value a more liberal policy higher. Ferris (1991) argues that differences in population density across municipalities may influence the relative demand for Sunday opening. Customers in low population density areas will value distance higher than longer shopping times, increasing the possibilities for small shop owners to resist opening on Sundays.
To test this theory, population density (DE i ) is included as well.
The third theory is based on the ideological colour of the municipality.
Posner ( However, the policy outcome does not only depend on the direct balance of power in the municipality council, but also on the influence of church members on the political parties. Although church and state are separated in the 8 Netherlands, local church members often try to influence the policy debate.
Therefore, municipalities with more active church members may show more restrictive Sunday policies. 6 To test this effect we include the percentage of inhabitants that are active church members (CH i ).
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As large cities in the Netherlands are ethnically heterogeneous societies with a diverse attitude towards Sundays, they will put more emphasis on a liberal policy. Moreover, as shopping on Sundays is used as a form of entertainment, larger municipalities have a better infrastructure for 'fun-shopping'. Ferris Furthermore, to check for non-linearity the number of inhabitants squared is included as well.
The fourth theory is based on regional differences. Gradus (2001) Table 3 (see Appendix A for a description of the variables).
[Insert Table 3 here] [Insert Table 4 here]
IV Results
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The theory regarding interests of shop owners explains part of the differences in shop policies. Municipalities with a larger number of shops have a higher probability of a more liberal Sunday policy. The coefficient for the number of shops is significant and positive in both the binary and ordered probit. In the binary probit competitive pressure of neighbouring municipalities results in a lower probability of closed shops on all Sundays. In the ordered probit estimation this relation is not found. Apparently, the competitive The results for the household size and the number of households with double income show that differences in social demand explain part of the variation in shop policies. Municipalities with larger families and less households with a double income have a higher probability to have more restrictive Sunday policies. This is similar to Ferris (1991) and Price and Yandle (1987) , where higher female participation stimulates Sunday opening. This result is also in accordance with the theoretical result by Thum (1997) . The population density variable is not significant suggesting that Sunday opening is not more likely in a sparsely inhabited area. This result is contrary to Ferris (1991) . A possible explanation is that the variation in the Netherlands is far less pronounced than in Canada.
The results for ideology are quite clear and stronger compared with Ferris (1991) and Price and Yandle (1987) . Municipalities with more orthodox protestant (SGP and CU) aldermen show a much larger probability to have conservative policies. 12 Interestingly, the CDA-variable is insignificant.
Although the Christian Democratic Party has a historical foundation in
Christian religion, the influence on Sunday shop opening is apparently not present. Evidence exist that some non-Christian parties might also stimulate a restrictive policy. The variables for PvdA (in the binary estimation) and for SP (in the ordered probit) show that social considerations might play a decisive role in the policy debate. 13 The liberal philosophy of D66 cannot explain the significant negative coefficient for this party. However, there is no significance in the ordered probit. The second variable measuring the influence of ideology, the incidence of active church members, is significant in both estimations.
Municipalities with more active church member citizens have more stringent Sunday policies.
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The coefficient of inhabitants squared in the binary probit estimation makes clear that the positive effect of the number of customers diminishes. Ferris (1991) . Indeed, if we exclude the 75 municipalities which have less than 9,500 inhabitants the coefficient for inhabitants squared is no longer significant. This intuition corresponds with the insignificant coefficient of the squared variable in the ordered probit estimation.
The data show some evidence for the regional differences argument. In the ordered probit the coefficients for the provinces Brabant, Zeeland, Limburg and
Overijssel are significant at 95%, while the coefficients for Limburg and Zeeland are significant at 90% in the ordered probit. These regressions imply that there is some evidence that cross-border shopping is an important element for the opening hour's policy in municipalities especially adjacent to Belgium. This is in accordance with Ferris (2000) who found that after a period of intensive cross border shopping (due to a Canadian/US exchange rate that favoured US shopping), competition was a major stimulus in liberalizing Sunday shopping in Ontario. 14 An interesting question is whether the estimation results give information about the relative weight of the variables. Calculation of the change in probabilities for the binary SO i if the variables representing the theories are varied by one standard deviation reveals that ideology and regional culture play a larger role than the other theories. Especially the number of inhabitants, the presence of SGP, CU and D66-aldermen, the number of active church members and the regional culture influence the Sunday policy (see Table 5 ). 16 For example, if the number of inhabitants increases with one standard deviation, the probability that a municipality allows Sunday opening increases with 22%. Moreover, if the number of active church members increases from 13 to 18 per 100 inhabitants the probability decreases with 16%.
[Insert Table 5 here]
V Robustness
As multicollinearity may play a role we estimate also specifications excluding some of the variables to analyse whether standard errors are influenced. These estimations give no indication that multicollinearity influences our conclusions. Table 4 and 6). However,
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household size (HS) is no longer significant in the binary estimation of the new model, while it is only significant at 10% in the ordered probit estimation.
Nevertheless, HS is not a variable where endogeneity might be expected.
[Insert Table 6 here] Furthermore, the impact factor for surrounding municipalities (EN) is no longer significant in the binary estimation. As it was already insignificant in the ordered probit, the conclusion is that the proof for the effect of surrounding shop policies is very weak. This could result from an endogeneity problem. In If Moran's I is zero no spatial autocorrelation is present.
Using software described in Ferstl (2004) we calculate Moran's I for different weighing schemes.
19 Table 7 summarizes the results. Nearly all Moran's I's are insignificant. Only for large distances a significant result is found. However, in these cases Moran's I is very small and even negative. We conclude that spatial autocorrelation is not present.
[Insert Table 7 here]
VI Conclusions
Since 1996 the decision on Sunday shop opening is deregulated to the municipal The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that municipal control over Sunday shopping hours results in a considerable variation in policies. As this variation is related to significant differences between municipalities, 18 deregulation to the local level allows municipalities to take account of local characteristics. Clearly, reasons exist to decentralize the decision on Sunday shopping opening from an economic point of view.
In this paper we only investigate the policy decision by the municipality. Less 
Notes
1 This information is based on OECD (1997) and an update using website information of the responsible authorities in different countries.
2 As an alternative we estimate also a logit model. All results are very similar.
3 Neighbourhood municipalities are defined as those municipalities that are 24 no further away than 25 kilometres (17 miles). Alternative assumptions with different maximum distances are also tested. See section IV.
4 On a national scale these parties are small (each about 2% of total votes).
However, the influence of these parties is large for some municipalities as the voters are regionally concentrated.
5 Mayor and aldermen form the executive board. The mayor, whose executive power is limited, is appointed by the central government. The aldermen are elected by the municipal council. As a result of the proportional representation system only in a small minority of the municipalities one of the parties (most times CDA or PvdA) has a majority in the municipal council. In general, a coalition of parties has to be formed that governs the municipality for four years.
Each coalition party has one or more aldermen, based on the size of the parties.
The total number of aldermen depends on the number of inhabitants. As long as the coalition is stable, policies proposed by the aldermen will in general be accepted by the council.
6 A different interpretation of the church attendance variable is that when the number of people going to church increases, the market size of Sunday shoppers decreases. This means that shop owners will have fewer incentives to open their shop on Sundays.
7 In the Netherlands a large part of church members never attends church 25 services. The included variable is related to members that attend church services at least once per week. The literature about the relation between religion and economics regularly finds different effects of religion and its intensity as in Barro and McCleary (2003) . In our case variables representing church membership are not significant.
8 In both countries excises and value-added taxes are set on a national level.
9 The categories two till five presented in Table 2 are further divided in two subcategories in the ordered probit model, based on an opening regime for part of or the whole municipality (see Appendix A).
13 Note that the coefficient for PvdA does not differ significantly from the coefficients of SGP and CU in the binary case. However, the coefficients of SGP and SP do differ in the ordered probit case.
14 Interestingly, variables representing the incidence of church members that are less active (in terms of the number of times they attend services) are not significant. Results are available upon request. 
